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Abstract 
Recent research strengthens the conjecture that human decision-making stems from a complex 
interaction of rational judgment and emotional processes. A prominent example of the impact of 
emotions in economic decision-making is the effect of regret-related information feedback on bidding 
behaviour in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Revealing the information “missed opportunity to win” 
upon losing an auction, results in higher bids. Revealing the information “money left on the table” 
upon winning an auction, results in lower bids. The common explanation for this pattern is winner and 
loser regret. However, this explanation is still hypothetical and little is known about the actual 
emotional processes that underlie this phenomenon. This paper investigates actual emotional 
processes in auctions with varying feedback information. Thereby, we provide an approach that 
combines an auction experiment with psychophysiological measures which indicate emotional 
involvement. Our economic results are in line with those of previous studies. Moreover, we can show 
that loser regret results in a stronger emotional response than winner regret. Remarkably, loser regret 
is strong for high values of “missed opportunity.” However, the pattern for different amounts of 
“money left on the table” is diametric to what winner regret theory suggests. 
Keywords: Auctions, Emotions, Regret, Design Research Methods and Methodologies, Design of 
Information Systems 
              
1 Introduction 
Auctions have turned out to be “one of the greatest success stories of web-based services” (Ariely and 
Simonson, 2003). However, our understanding of how rational and emotional processes of human 
decision-making interact in the context of electronic markets is rather limited. Over the last years 
theoretical research has provided sophisticated economic models which investigate rational bidding 
behavior (e.g. Krishna, 2002). However, these models do not consider emotional aspects of human 
decision-making. Moreover, experimental tests have shown that the models often fail to accurately 
predict human decisions. Besides their mathematical beauty, normative models alone are thus not 
sufficient to fully capture human decision-making. 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) states that a bidder’s behavior in a first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auction 
does not only depend on the monetary profit she expects to gain, but also on two specific emotions, 
namely loser and winner regret. In a FPSB auction, each bidder submits a single sealed-bid. The 
bidder who has placed the highest bid obtains the item and has to pay the amount of her bid. The 
bidder suffers from loser regret if she loses the auction, but learns that the object was sold for a price 
below her own valuation. This means that with a higher bid she could have won the item and made a 
profit. Contrariwise, a bidder suffers from winner regret if she wins a FPSB auction but gets notice of 
the second highest bid. She then knows that she has paid more than necessary because with any bid 
just slightly above the second highest bid she would have won the item at a lower price. The 
prerequisite for experiencing winner or loser regret is the feedback or the information provided in a 
FPSB auction. In order to experience loser regret (winner regret), the highest bid (second-highest bid) 
must be revealed to the bidders. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) confirm this theory by 
analyzing in a laboratory experiment. However, so far little is known about the actual emotional 
processes which are responsible for the observed change in behavior. 
In this paper, we seek to shed more light on the question to what extent different feedback provided 
after an auction impacts the emotions and the decisions of human bidders. More specifically, we 
conduct a laboratory experiment in which we vary the feedback provided to auction participants and 
measure their physiological correlates of emotional processing. In line with Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
(1989) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008), we find a systematic relation between feedback 
information and bidding behavior. In addition, our results provide psychophysiological evidence for 
the emotional processing of feedback information in electronic auctions. In terms of psycho-
physiology, loser regret results in higher physiological responses than winner regret. Thereby, we 
confirm the theoretical assumption of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) that the intensity of 
loser regret increases with the amount of missed profit. In contrast to the theoretical assumptions of 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, however, winning an auction at an unfavorable price does not 
significantly arouse bidders. To the contrary, winning the auction with exactly the right bid or only 
one unit too much results in a very strong emotional response. This finding can be explained by 
considering relief and rejoice as two intense and influential emotions in the bidding process. The 
remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of how feedback 
in Information Systems can induce emotions of winner and loser regret. Section 3 presents the 
experimental design of our study. In Section 4, we present and discuss the economic as well as the 
psychophysiological results of the experiment. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Regret in Electronic Auctions 
2.1 Regret in Economic Decision-Making 
Electronic market design is far from being a trivial task (Weinhardt et al., 2003). As Roth (2002) put 
it, “markets don’t always grow like weeds - some of them are hothouse orchids.” Especially auctions 
allow for a large spectrum of design parameters, and even slight variations in the auction mechanism 
can lead to large disparities in bidding behavior and, subsequently, in auction outcome and seller 
revenue (Milgrom, 2004). The success of auction design crucially depends on a profound 
understanding of human behavior, e.g. the behavior of market participants interacting in an electronic 
market. In this respect, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007) note: “Since the quality of the 
resulting auction design depends on the predictive ability of the theory, we need a good predictive 
theory.” In contrast, if the understanding of the agent behavior is rather limited, the market outcome 
may deviate considerably from the objectives of the market engineer and even result in massive losses. 
Thereby, regret is highly important in human decision-making. 
Regret can be defined as an aversive emotion a decision-maker experiences upon the discovery that 
she could have gained a higher level of utility if she had taken a different choice in the past 
(Humphrey, 2004). Emphasizing the importance of regret in human emotional processing Levinson 
(1978) argues that “regret is a common, possibly a universal, human experience.” Because regret is an 
aversive emotion, human decision-makers tend to anticipate future regret and consequently seek to 
avoid this emotion by changing their behavior. Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004) argue that even if 
“feelings of regret” are considered irrational from a theoretical perspective, this “does not preclude 
their existence.” Gilovich and Medvec (1995) show that regret is an essential experience in order to 
learn how to take advantageous decisions in the future and Coricelli at al. (2007) state that regret 
seems also from a neuroscience perspective to be central in human decision making. In terms of the 
prominent somatic marker hypothesis of Bechara and Damasio (2005) the auction outcome is a 
primary inducer of regret, while thinking about the auction outcome during the process of decision-
making is regarded as a secondary inducer. Crone et al. (2004) show that those individuals, who 
process secondary inducers more strongly, take on average more advantageous decisions.  
2.2 Winner and Loser Regret in Auctions 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) introduces a model of post-auction regret in first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) 
auctions. According to this model, a bidder’s utility does not only depend on her monetary profit, but 
also on winner and loser regret. The author argues that a winner will experience winner regret if upon 
winning she is informed about the second highest bid. Engelbrecht-Wiggans refers to this feeling as 
“money left on the table” regret, because ex post the winner could have gained a higher profit with a 
lower bid. In contrast, the loser of an auction will suffer from loser regret if she becomes informed 
about the highest bid. Engelbrecht-Wiggans refers to this feeling as “missed opportunity” regret, 
because ex post the loser of a FPSB auction may have gained a profit by raising her bid. If bidders 
know that they will receive post-auction information regarding the highest and second highest bid, 
they can anticipate winner and loser regret during decision-making and reflect this concern in their 
bidding strategy. If bidders put equal weights on winner and loser regret, Engelbrecht-Wiggans shows 
analytically that their utility maximizing bidding strategies are independent of regret. If, however, 
bidders put more weight on loser (winner) regret, they place higher (lower) bids in equilibrium. 
Vickrey (1961) derives a symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibrium (RNNE) bidding strategy. However, 
it is a well-established result of experimental economics that human individuals place higher bids than 
Vickrey’s RNNE suggests (cf. Kagel, 1995). Cox et al. (1988) explain bids above RNNE levels by 
bidders with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Following the argumentation of Engelbrecht-
Wiggans (1989) however, bidding above the RNNE can also be explained with anticipated loser 
regret. In this spirit, Kagel (1995) argues that “risk aversion is one element, but far from the only 
element, generating bidding above the RNNE.” Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2009) explicitly test 
the CRRA model against the regret model in a laboratory experiment. They find “virtually no support 
for the risk aversion model,” but strong support for the regret model. Emphasizing the importance of 
regret in economic decision-making in general, the authors show that regret theory can also explain 
contradictory results of various studies, which cannot be explained with risk aversion. 
Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) conduct a laboratory experiment in order to analyze the impact of 
winner and loser regret in FPSB auctions. In a between-subject design, individuals participate in a 
FPSB auction, in which either the highest bid (loser regret), the second highest bid (winner regret), or 
no such information (no feedback) is revealed. In order to exclude learning effects, the authors opted 
for a one-shot design, in which bidders simultaneously place bids for a couple of auctions out of which 
only one is randomly chosen and conducted. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay find support for anticipated loser 
regret, as bidders place significantly higher bids under this condition. However, subjects do not seem 
to anticipate winner regret, as these bids are not significantly different from those in the no feedback 
treatment. Based on a post-auction questionnaire, in which subjects subjectively report on their 
individual feelings of regret, Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay conclude that loser regret is significantly stronger 
than winner regret. However, although winner regret is not reflected in the bidding behavior, it is still 
experienced as soon as the auction outcome is revealed. 
In contrast to Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) explicitly 
include learning effects in their laboratory experiment by letting bidders consecutively take part in a 
series of FPSB auctions. Additionally, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok run a treatment, in which 
both, the highest and the second highest bids are revealed. They find support for the theory of loser 
regret. Further, the authors report a significant decrease of bids over time in the winner regret 
treatment and a slight decrease in the treatment with both types of regret. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and 
Katok conclude that individuals can only reflect winner regret in their behavior, if they have “actually 
experienced it several times.” However, although winner regret can supposedly be learned over time, 
individuals still “put more weight on the loser’s regret than on the winner’s regret.” 
3 Experimental Design 
The main focus of this paper is to investigate the impact of different information feedback elements on 
the emotional processing and bidding behavior of human individuals in electronic markets. In short we 
focus on the following research questions: (1) Can the emotional processes of regret be manipulated 
by systematically varying information feedback and (2) how are these emotions reflected in bidding 
behavior? Therefore, we conduct a laboratory experiment, in which we manipulate the feedback 
information in FPSB auctions. The experiment is closely linked to the experiment conducted by 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008). However, while Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok cannot 
determine to what extent the information feedback induces the emotion regret, we use 
psychophysiological measurements in order to directly determine the intensity of emotions in the 
moment they actually occur. More specifically, we continuously measure the participants’ skin 
conductivity as a proxy for their emotional processing (cf. Dawson et al., 2007). Skin conductivity is a 
reliable indicator for arousal it reflects the intensity of an ongoing emotional process. In compliance 
with the theory of induced values (Smith, 1976), all decisions in this experiment are directly related to 
real monetary payoffs. This means that each bidder has to accumulate so-called monetary units (MU), 
which are individually converted into Euro and paid out in cash after the experiment. Thereby, 1 MU 
is equivalent to €0.03. Initially subjects are endowed with 100 MU as a lump sum payment. Monetary 
units were chosen to keep the payment scheme simple and that feasible bids were integers. This 
procedure is state-of-the-art in economic experiments (Guala, 2005). With respect to reliability of 
economic experiments Falk and Heckman (2009) note that “behavior in the laboratory is reliable and 
real: Participants in the lab are human beings who perceive their behavior as relevant, experience real 
emotions, and take decisions with real economic consequences.” 
3.1 Treatment Structure 
In the experiment, each bidder takes part in a series of 50 FPSB auctions. Similar to Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok (2008), each subject bids against two computerized agents to exclude social 
preferences and other interpersonal effects. Thus, there is no strategic interaction with other human 
bidders in this experiment. In each auction, the human and the computerized bidders each receive an 
individual valuation vi for the item for sale in the auction. Then, each bidder i individually has to 
decide for an integer bid bi between 0 MU and 100 MU. The bidder who placed the highest bid wins 
the auction and has to pay the amount of her bid. The incentive for participating is to obtain the profit 
Πi = vi - bi in the case of winning. In the case of a draw, the human bidder automatically wins. The 
computerized agents independently draw valuations form a uniform distribution with support on the 
integer set {0, 1, 2, …, 100} MU. Following the symmetric Nash equilibrium of (Vickrey, 1961), each 
computerized agent places a bid bi according to the function ܾ௜ሺݒ௜ሻ ൌ ሺ2/3ሻݒ௜ in all treatments. 
Thereby, the computerized agents assume that the valuations of the human bidder stem from the same 
distribution as their own valuations. However, following the approach of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and 
Katok (2008), the human bidder receives her valuation from a permutation of the values 50 MU, 60 
MU, 70 MU, 80 MU, and 90 MU. The bidder keeps a randomly chosen valuation for 10 consecutive 
auctions. For instance, a bidder receives the valuation of 80 in the first auction and then keeps this 
valuation until she receives a new valuation in the eleventh auction.    
  
 Treatments 
 Loser Regret (LR) No Regret (NR) Winner Regret (WR) 
Revelation of “missed 
opportunity” to losing bidders yes no no 
Revelation of “money left on the 
table” to winning bidders no no yes 
Number of subjects 24 30 24 
Number of sessions 4 5 4 
Table 1. Experimental Design 
As depicted in Table 1, the experiment comprises three treatments: Loser Regret (LR), Winner Regret 
(WR), and No Regret (NR). The experiment is based on a between-subject design (Kagel, 1995), i.e. 
subjects exclusively participate in the LR, WR, or NR treatment. The treatments vary in the form of 
feedback information provided to the bidders after an auction ends. In the Loser Regret (LR) 
treatment, bidders are provided with information regarding the highest bid in case of losing an auction. 
The amount of “missed opportunity” is provided, i.e. the maximum profit a bidder could have gained 
ex post by placing a higher bid. This amount equals to the own valuation vi minus the highest bid. 
Thereby, a bidder can learn ex post that she actually could have gained a profit by placing a higher 
bid. In the Winner Regret (WR) treatment, bidders are provided with information regarding the second-
highest bid in case of winning an auction. The amount of “money left on the table” is provided, i.e. the 
difference between the winning bid and the second highest bid. Thereby, a bidder can learn ex post 
that she actually paid too much and could have gained a higher profit by placing a lower bid. In 
contrast, in the No Regret (NR) treatment, bidders are only informed whether they won or lost an 
auction. They do not obtain any information regarding bids of the other bidders.  
The experimental system is implemented using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In order to allow for 
analyzing physiological reactions in response to single information events, the feedback information is 
provided in timed intervals. After the end of an auction, first a bidder is only informed whether she 
won or lost the auction. After 5 seconds, the “missed opportunity” and “money left on the table” 
information is displayed in the LR and WR treatments, respectively. In the NR treatment, no 
additional information is provided. 
3.2 Procedure and Physiological Measurements 
This laboratory experiment was conducted at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). Participants 
were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students using the ORSEE software environment 
(Greiner, 2003). Altogether 78 (19 female and 59 male) subjects participated in 13 sessions. Each 
session lasted approximately 1.5 hours. In this experiment, the average payment was €19.82, with 
€12.30 and €23.01 being the minimum and maximum payments, respectively. During the whole 
experiment, participants’ skin conductivity was recorded with a constant current amplifier 
measurement system and Ag/AgCl (silver/silver chloride) electrodes. The electrodes were attached on 
the thenar and hypothenar eminences of the palm of the non-dominant hand by use of standard EDA 
electrode paste (cf. Boucsein, 1992). Following the recommendations of Schmidt and Walach (2000) 
an initial 5 minute rest period is conducted during this preparation phase for calibration purposes. 
Moreover, participant interactions with the experimental system is limited to mouse inputs and 
participants are equipped with a pair of ear-muffs to avoid sensitivity to background noise. All 
sessions were conducted in spring 2010 with an average room temperature of 25 °C (77 °F). These 
values are within the methodological recommendations of the Society for Psychophysiological 
Research (cf. Fowles et al., 1981). One subject had to be removed from the whole dataset due to failed 
comprehension. For one session in the NR treatment, physiological measurements failed to operate. 
Moreover, 12 participants turned out to be non-responders regarding electrodermal activity, i.e. they 
do not show physiological responses. Hence, the economic analysis is based on 77 participants. The 
physiological analysis is based on 59 participants. 
4 Results 
In this section we present and discuss the economic as well as the psychophysiological results of the 
experiment. The key focus of the study is to investigate how the provision of loser and winner regret 
information changes the emotional processing of participants, and if this emotional process is linked to 
actual bidding behavior. 
4.1 Feedback Information and Bidding Behavior 
First we focus on how different feedback information influences bidding behavior. Following the 
theoretical predictions of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989), providing the bidders with the loser (winner) 
regret information should result in higher (lower) bids. This is reflected in the Hypotheses H1 and H2: 
 Hypothesis H1. Bidders place higher bids, if they are informed about missed opportunities (LR 
treatment) in comparison to the NR treatment. 
 Hypothesis H2. Bidders place lower bids, if they are provided with the information how much 
money they “left on the table” (WR treatment) in comparison to the NR treatment. 
Figure 1 depicts box plots for the distribution of bids in the three treatments of the experiment. The 
box plots show the quartiles of the bids, as well as the minimum and maximum observation. As stated 
in hypothesis H1, the bids in the LR treatment are above the bids in the NR treatment. Moreover, and 
in line with hypothesis H2, the bids in the WR treatment are below the bids in the NR treatment. In 
order to analyze whether the results are comparable with previous work, we calculate the ratio of a 
bidder’s valuation and her actual bid, the so-called bid/value ratio (b/v).  
 
 
Figure 1. Bids for each treatment 
The average bid/value ratios of our experiment are summarized along with the previous results in the 
literature in Table 2. In parentheses, the standard deviations are given. Our economic results are in line 
with those of previous studies. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) observe bid/value ratios of 0.79 and 
0.77 for subjects in the NR and LR treatments, respectively. 
 
 LR NR WR 
Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2007) 
(4 bidders per auction) 0.87 0.79 0.77 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2008) 
(3 bidders per auction) 0.776 (.048) 0.715 (.069) 0.697 (.065) 
Present study 
(3 bidders per auction) 0.756 (.057) 0.729 (.061) 0.696 (.050) 
Table 2. Summary of Bid-Value Ratios 
In contrast, subjects in the LR condition place significantly higher bids (0.87). Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
and Katok (2008) report average bid-value ratios of 0.77 for LR bids. Subjects exposed to LR and NR 
place bids of 0.72 and 0.70, respectively. In all three experiments, the bidders on average place their 
bids above the theoretical benchmark of the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy. 
 
 Coefficient ߚ Standard error Standardized ߚ Significance 
c (constant) 18.888 1.991  < .001 
v (valuation) .465 .651 .767 < .001 
LR 1.858 .651 .100 < .005 
WR -2.292 .767 -.124 < .001 
R² (corrected R²) .626 (.623) 
Observations 385 
Table 3. Regression model for the bids 
We use an OLS regression model, in order to test the statistical significance of loser regret and winner 
regret on the bidders’ bids. Different to Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) we explicitly look at 
the valuation (50, 60, 70, 80, 90) as independent and the bid as dependent variable rather than only the 
bid/value ratio as dependent variable. Thus, with 77 subjects in the economic analysis and 5 
observations per subject, the regression is based on 385 observations. Table 2 shows the results of the 
OLS regression. In line with hypothesis H1, bidders place higher bids in the LR treatment in 
comparison to the NR treatment (p < .01). Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis that “missed 
opportunity” feedback information has no impact on bidding behavior in favor for hypothesis H1. 
Moreover, and in line with hypothesis H2 bidders place lower bids in the WR treatment in comparison 
to the loser regret treatment (p < .001). Therefore, we can also reject the null hypothesis that “money 
left on the table” feedback information has no impact on bidding behavior in favor for hypothesis H2. 
In summary, we conclude from the economic data that bidders place higher bids in the LR treatment 
(hypothesis H1) and lower bids in the WR treatment (hypothesis H2). When taking a closer look at the 
constant term c of the regression, one can observe that c is above zero (18.888). Thus, including a 
bidder’s valuation v in the analysis allows for a more finely grained analysis than the simplified 
bid/value ratio used for reasons of comparability with the other studies in Table 3 which implicitly 
assume that c is zero. 
4.2 Feedback Information and Emotional Processing 
Little is known about subjects’ actual emotional processing in response to varying regret feedback 
information in FPSB auctions. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) argue that the utility a bidder 
derives from a FPSB auction does not only depend on the monetary gains and losses, but also on the 
degree of winner and loser regret. According to Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) the perceived 
ex ante expected utility of a bidder with valuation v and bid b is 
Πሺb, vሻ ≡ ሺݒ െ ܾሻܨሺܾሻ െ න ߙሺܾ െ ݖሻ݀ܨሺݖሻ െ
ݖ:ݖ൑ܾ
න ߚሺݒ െ ݖሻ݀ܨሺݖሻ
ݖ:ܾ൑ݖ൑ݒ
 
where z denotes the highest bid made by the competitors (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008). F 
denotes the cumulative distribution function of ݖ. The first part of the formula refers to the expected 
monetary payoff as postulated by standard auction theory. The latter part takes into account the 
disutility of winner regret and loser regret, respectively. The amount of “missed opportunity” 
translates into ሺݒ െ ݖሻ. The amount of “money left on the table” translates into ሺܾ െ ݖሻ. The 
coefficients ߙ and ߚ refer to the weight of winner and loser regret, respectively. Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
and Katok (2008) theoretically show that if bidders equally weigh winner and loser regret ሺߙ ൌ ߚሻ, 
then regret has no influence on decision-making in FPSB auctions. However, the authors conclude 
from their experimental results that “participants put more weight on the loser’s regret than on the 
winner’s regret” ሺߙ ൏ ߚሻ. We specifically analyze the bidders’ emotional response in the very 
moment the bidders learn about their “missed opportunity” and “money left on the table,” respectively. 
Thereby, we test the conjecture that the loser regret is weighted stronger than winner regret ሺߙ ൏ ߚሻ. 
This translates into hypothesis H3. 
 Hypothesis H3. The emotional response to the feedback information in the LR treatment (“missed 
opportunity”) is stronger than in the WR treatment (“money left on the table”). 
The emotional response is assessed by analyzing the skin conductivity data. The bidders’ log 
transformed average skin conductance response amplitudes (SCR.amp) in response to receiving the 
“missed opportunity” and “money left on the table” feedback information for the LR and WR 
treatment are depicted in Figure 3. As by construction there is no such feedback information provided 
in the NR treatment, there are also no physiological responses to feedback information in the NR 
treatment. The SCR.amp is a proxy for the intensity of immediate emotions induced by a discrete 
stimulus. As this response usually occurs 1 to 3 seconds after the event (e.g. Boucsein, 1992; Schmidt 
and Walach, 2000), only amplitudes are taken into account, which are observed in that specific time 
frame. Furthermore, amplitudes have to comply with a predefined amplitude criterion, i.e. amplitudes 
have to be greater or equal to 0.01 µS (cf. Fowles et al., 1981). The SCR.amp values are obtained by 
decomposing skin conductivity into its tonic and phasic components with the Ledalab analysis 
software (Benedek and Kaernbach, 2010). Following the recommendation of Venables and Christie 
(1980), all SCR.amp values x are then transformed according to log(x+1) in order to reduce the 
inherent skewness of SCR.amp values. In the analysis, we focus specifically on the average SCR.amp 
in response to learning different feedback information in the LR and WR treatment, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Average SCR.amp to Loser Regret Information and Winner Regret Information 
As depicted in Figure 2, the physiological response to the feedback information in the LR treatment is 
stronger than the response to the feedback information in the WR treatment. Therefore, we reject the 
null hypothesis in favor of H3 (0.104 µS vs. 0.076 µS, two-tailed t-test, p < .05). The bidders in fact 
show a stronger emotional response to the feedback information in the LR treatment. This is in line 
with the assumption of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) that the participants weigh the loser 
regret information stronger than the winner regret information ሺߙ ൏ ߚሻ. After observing the 
differences between the WR and LR treatment, we will now turn our focus on subjects’ varying 
physiological responses within the two regret treatment groups. 
4.3 Emotional Processing of the Loser Regret Information 
First we take a closer look on the emotional processing of the LR feedback information. Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok (2008) state that “regret enters additively into the bidder’s utility function, and 
that the effect of regret on the bidder’s utility function is proportional to the amount of regret 
suffered.” Following this statement, we would assume that the experienced regret increases with the 
value of the “missed opportunity.” In the utility function of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) as 
depicted in Section 4.2, this translates into the term ߚሺݒ െ ݖሻ. If this is true, the bidders’ emotional 
response should be stronger for increasing values of ሺݒ െ ݖሻ. This translates into hypothesis H4: 
 Hypothesis H4. The emotional response to the feedback information in the LR treatment is 
stronger for high amounts of “missed opportunity” than for low amounts of “missed opportunity.” 
 
 
Figure 3.  Mean SCR to different classes of Loser Regret Information (each class n = 51) 
The bidders’ log transformed average skin conductance response amplitudes (SCR.amp) in response to 
learning the regret information in the LR treatment for different amounts of “missed opportunity” is 
depicted in Figure 3. Each class consists of 51 observations. Figure 3 indicates that the 
psychophysiological response increases with higher amounts of “missed opportunity.” This is in line 
with our hypothesis H4. Unfortunately, the correlation between the emotional response and the 
increasing degrees of “missed opportunity” is not significant for these 4 classes. Therefore, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis. We attribute this to the high between-subject variability of skin conductivity 
and the low number of observations for different degrees of “missed opportunity.” When taking 
instead of 4 classes two classes each with 102 observations, a simple one-sided t-test reveals that the 
emotional response to the two different classes of MO is significantly different at p < 0.09. At this 
stage, we can conclude that “missed opportunity” leads an intense emotional response, which is 
stronger than the “money left on the table” information. The question whether higher amounts “missed 
opportunity” result in stronger emotional responses will have to be investigated in future research. 
4.4 Emotional Processing of the Winner Regret Information 
In the next step the emotional processing of the WR feedback information will be analyzed. According 
to Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) the winner regret should also rise with increasing amounts 
of “money left on the table.” In the utility function as depicted in Section 4.2, this is reflected in the 
term ߙሺܾ െ ݖሻ. When regret increases with the amount of money left on the table this also should be 
observable within the physiological data. This translates into hypothesis H5: 
 Hypothesis H5. The emotional response to the feedback information in the WR treatment is 
stronger for high amounts of “money left on the table” than for low amounts of “money left on the 
table.” 
 
 
Figure 4.  Average SCR.amp to different classes of Winner Regret Information 
 
In contrast to the last section, the physiological data does not support the model of Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok (2008) regarding the winner regret. Quite to the contrary, the bidders experience 
high intensities of emotional processing for low values of ሺܾ െ ݖሻ. The bidders’ log transformed 
average skin conductance response amplitudes (SCR.amp) in response to learning the regret 
information in the WR treatment for different amounts of “money left on the table” is depicted in 
Figure 4. Very small values of “money left on the table” (i.e. values of 0 or 1) induce very high 
physiological responses. On the other hand, high amounts of “money left on the table” result in 
relatively small responses (0.116 vs. 0.066, two-tailed t-test, p < .05). Taking into account the 
physiological data, it seems that actually the experience of winning an auction with a very small 
amount ahead reveals relief or a thrill of winning and is central to participants. Suffering from winner 
regret on the other hand, when winning at a not optimal price, does not seem to be central in subjects’ 
emotional experience. Therefore, we state that winner regret is only minor and not that important in 
subjects’ emotional processing compared to loser regret. This high response can be interpreted as 
relief or even thrill of winning instead of winner regret, since the bidder won by a very small amount. 
4.5 Discussion 
The hypotheses in the present study are closely linked to those of Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok 
(2008). The majority of the initial hypotheses are supported by our data. This confirms the view that 
emotions, more specifically regret, can be deliberately elicited by well planned design features of 
Information Systems. In addition our data strengthens the claim that these design features can also 
influence bidding decisions. Our results do not only support the original view of how regret effects 
bidding behavior. The original hypothesis that the intensity of winner regret increases with the amount 
of “money left on the table” is challenged by the present study. With the support of physiological 
measures it becomes apparent that bidders show a stronger reaction to near gains, than to huge 
amounts of “money left on the table.” Different explanations for this deviation from theory are 
possible. It is possible that feelings of relief and rejoice outweigh the importance of winner regret. 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) point to a similar explanation. 
Regarding their experiment Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) state “that subjects tend to 
anticipate loser’s regret, but tend not to anticipate winner’s regret until they have experienced it a 
couple of times.” Since loser regret is more intuitive than winner regret, this could be an explanation 
for the differing emotional responses. Alternatively, loser regret after losing an auction could simply 
be more arousing than winner regret after the experience of winning. The good experience of winning 
cannot be distracted by the information of how much “money (was) left on the table.”  
5 Conclusion and Outlook 
Including emotions into economic models of human behavior in electronic markets has been long 
overdue. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2008) has developed such a model for bidding in FPSB auctions that 
includes two very decision relevant emotions, namely loser regret and winner regret. Although the 
model has been tested empirically the integration of emotions into the bidding process is based on 
purely theoretical assumptions. The present study fills this gap by actually measuring bidders’ 
physiological reactions to regret relevant information. Resulting from the cited previous work on 
regret in FPSB auctions two major research questions were posed: (1) Can the emotional processes of 
regret be manipulated by systematically varying information feedback and (2) how are these emotions 
reflected in bidding behavior? The first questions can be answered with a clear “yes.” As depicted in 
Figure 2 bidders experience more intense emotions, upon receiving loser regret information compared 
to receiving winner regret information. The second research question can only be answered in parts. 
Even though different feedback information elicits different physiological patterns and significantly 
different bidding behavior, the relationship between bidding behavior and emotional response is a 
complex interaction of rational and emotional processes, including regret and relief. In order to better 
understand this relationship, there is a need for future research. 
In this paper we provide physiological evidence for winner and loser regret. Moreover, physiological 
data strongly indicates that the original assumption of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2008) about the weight 
with which bidders incorporate winner regret into their bid needs to be reviewed and possibly 
renewed. We conclude that emotional processes can be deliberately manipulated by Information 
Systems design. We also conclude that psychophysiology is a valuable methodology to move forward 
from purely theoretical assumptions about emotions in decision making. Developing this approach 
further will give detailed information about how different facets of information systems are 
emotionally processed by the recipient and how they ultimately stimulate behavior. 
Since using physiological measures in analyzing the interplay of Information Systems design, 
emotions and behavior is a rather new approach, opportunities for future research are extremely broad. 
In the present study we have only reported on skin conductivity as an indicator for the intensity of 
emotions. Including further physiological parameters, e.g. the heart rate, yields the possibility to 
extract more information about the quality of emotions. Given the fundamental impact of emotions, 
further analyzing the impact of information feedback with physiological measures seems a promising 
approach.  
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